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This paper examines asset-price bubbles in an economy where a 
nondepletable asset (e.g., land) can provide transaction services, using a 
variant of the cash-in-advance model. 
When a landowner can borrow money immediately using land as 
collateral, one can say that land essentially provides a transaction service. 
The transaction services that such an asset can provide increase as its price 
rises, since the asset owner can borrow more money against the asset's 
increased value. Thus an asset-price bubble can emerge due to the 
externality of self-reference wherein the asset price reflects the transaction 
services that it can provide, while the amount of the transaction services 
reflects the asset price. If the collateral ratio of the asset (θ) is not too high, 
there exists a steady state equilibrium where the asset price has a bubble 
component; if θexceeds a certain value, there exists no stable monetary 
equilibrium.  
The paper also analyzes the case where θ is determined as an 
equilibrium outcome. Finally, in the case where the equilibrium concept is 
relaxed to allow for sticky prices and a temporary supply-demand gap, the 
paper shows that there exists an equilibrium where a bubble develops 
temporarily and eventually bursts. 
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Abstract
This paper examines asset-price bubbles in an economy where a nondepletable
asset (e.g., land) can provide transaction services, using a variant of the cash-in-
advance model. When a landowner can borrow money immediately using land as
collateral, one can say that land essentially provides a transaction service. The
transaction services that such an asset can provide increase as its price rises, since
the asset owner can borrow more money against the asset’s increased value. Thus
an asset-price bubble can emerge due to the externality of self-reference wherein the
asset price reﬂects the transaction services that it can provide, while the amount
of the transaction services reﬂects the asset price. If the collateral ratio of the
asset (θ) is not too high, there exists a steady state equilibrium where the asset
price has a bubble component; if θ exceeds a certain value, there exists no stable
monetary equilibrium. The paper also analyzes the case where θ is determined as an
equilibrium outcome. Finally, in the case where the equilibrium concept is relaxed
to allow for sticky prices and a temporary supply-demand gap, the paper shows
∗I am grateful to Toni Braun and anonymous referees for helpful comments. All remaining errors are
mine.
1that there exists an equilibrium where a bubble develops temporarily and eventually
bursts.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
When an asset market overheats, the trading volume of the asset usually increases.
Figure 1 shows the price and the trading volume of land in Japan during the “real estate
bubble” period of 1987—91 and before and after that period.
Figure 1. Trading volume of land and urban land prices
On the one hand, the increase in demand for the asset caused by the expectation of
a rising price results in vigorous trade. On the other hand, this vigorous trade enhances
ease of sale, or liquidity, of the asset in the market. When liquidity increases, the asset
owner can borrow more money from banks by putting up the asset as collateral. For
example, during the “bubble” period in Japan, the collateral ratio of land in bank lending
was said to be greater than 100% (i.e., some banks were alleged to have lent money in
excess of 100% of the value of the collateralized land).
When an asset is easily exchanged for money, it can be said that it works as a de
facto medium of exchange just like money itself. In other words, the asset can provide
transaction services. This paper is a theoretical study of the deviation of an asset price
from its fundamental value when the asset can provide transaction services as a medium
of exchange. The basic idea can be roughly described as follows: Suppose that there exits
a nondepletable asset (land) and that the landowner can obtain money immediately by
borrowing from banks using the land as collateral. If the price of the asset is Qt,i t
can be plausibly assumed that the amount of money the owner of one unit of land can
b o r r o wf r o mab a n ki sw e a k l yi n c r e a s i n gi nQtθt,w h e r eθt (0 ≤ θt < 1) is a parameter
representing the collateral ratio of the asset, which may be exogenously given or may
be an equilibrium outcome determined by the ineﬃciencies of the real estate market.





Pt is the real asset price, Pt is the general price level, and M(·)i saw e a k l y
increasing function. At the same time, the real price of the asset is determined as a
discounted sum of the ﬂow of dividends that the land yields and the ﬂow of the value of





where ys is the present value of the dividend at date s as of date t and gs(Ls)i st h e
present value of liquidity Ls at date s as of date t. For simplicity, let us focus on the
steady state where we can omit time subscripts. In the steady state, the transaction
services L and the real asset price q are determined by
L = M(qθ)a n dq = Q(L), (1)
where Q(L) is an increasing function of L. As Figure 2 shows, L∗ that solves (1) may
be positive.
Figure 2. Land prices and liquidity
Thus, in the equilibrium, the asset may provide a positive amount of transaction services
L∗ and its price may become q∗ = Q(L∗), which is higher than the fundamental price of
the asset Q(0). The diﬀerence Q(L∗)−Q(0) can be regarded as the “bubble” component
of the asset price.1 The bubble is generated by a particular type of externality, or a
self-reference in transaction services that the asset can provide: An increase in the asset
price results in an increase in transaction services that the asset can provide, since the
asset is exchangeable for more money; and the increase in transaction services enhances
1To use the word “bubble” in this context may be somewhat misleading, since the diﬀerence Q(L
∗)−
Q(0) reﬂe c t st h ef a c tt h a tt h ea s s e tp r o v i d e st r a n s a c t i o nservices in addition to the dividends. Thus we
m a yb ea b l et os a yt h a tt h ef u n d a m e n t a lp r i c eo fa na s s e tw h e ni tp r o v i d e st r a n s a c t i o ns e r v i c e s( Q(L
∗)) is
higher than the fundamental price of it when it does not provide transaction services (Q(0)). Nevertheless,
Ic a l lt h ed i ﬀerence Q(L
∗) − Q(0) the bubble throughout in this paper, since the fundamental price of
an asset usually refers to the value from the dividends, not from transaction services.
3the value of the asset, causing a further increase in the asset price. Thus the amount of
transaction services that the asset can provide reﬂects the asset price, which reﬂects, in
turn, the transaction services.
There is a considerable amount of literature on asset-price bubbles (see Camerer
[1989] for a survey of rational growing bubbles, fads, and information bubbles). Exam-
ples of recent theoretical developments are Allen and Gale (2000), in which information
asymmetry and limited liability cause risk shifting from investors to banks, which leads to
asset-price bubbles; and Allen, Morris, and Shin (2003), in which higher order beliefs un-
der noisy public information generate distortions in asset pricing. But few authors have
addressed the problem of the transaction services that the asset can provide. Among
these few authors are Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and Bansal and Coleman (1996).
Kiyotaki and Wright show that there exists a bubble equilibrium in which an intrin-
sically useless asset (cash) has positive value since it provides transaction services. The
diﬀerence in their model from the present paper is that in their model, the amount of
transaction services that the cash can provide is physically limited by the assumption
that an exogenously ﬁxed amount of cash is exchangeable for one unit of goods. Since
I assume that the amount of transaction services that the asset can provide increases
as the real price of the asset increases, the asset price can follow a complicated path
as discussed in Section 3. Bansal and Coleman analyze a one-period bond as an asset
that provides transaction services. Because their asset is a ﬁxed-payment security with
a short maturity, the bubble component generated by the transaction services is small,
while in the present paper the asset is inﬁnitely long-lived and allows the emergence of
large bubbles. My model is quite similar to the model in Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) in
which a borrowing constraint plays a crucial role in determining the asset price. The
diﬀerence is that the collateral ratio θ in Section 3 in this paper is endogenously deter-
mined as an equilibrium outcome, while that in their model is exogenously given. Due
to this diﬀerence, multiple monetary equilibria emerge in my model, while there is no
such multiplicity in their model.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In the next section, I present the basic
4structure of the model, in which the collateral parameter θ is exogenous. It is shown
that if θ is large, there exists no steady state equilibrium. This result may imply that
when the asset market is too liquid, the economy becomes unstable. In Section 3, I
argue for a mechanism that endogenously determines θ and show that there are multiple
equilibria. In one equilibrium the asset price equals its fundamental price; in another
it has a bubble component. Section 4 examines an equilibrium path for the asset price
under the assumption of sticky prices. Under sticky prices, there exist equilibrium paths
in which an asset-price bubble temporarily develops and eventually bursts. Section 5
provides some concluding remarks.
2 The basic model
The basic model is a variant of the Lucas tree economy with a cash-in-advance constraint,
w h i c hi sc o m p o s e do fa ni n ﬁnite number of consumers and banks, and one government.
The economy is populated with a continuum of consumers with identical preferences,
whose measure is normalized to one. There is also a continuum of banks with measure




where β is the discount factor (0 < β < 1) and ct is the consumption at date t.
At each date t, the consumer is endowed with z units of consumer goods, which are
not durable. There is a nonperishable asset (land) in this economy, which has a ﬁxed
total supply of a. Initially each consumer owns a units of land at the beginning of date
0. I assume that one unit of land yields y units of consumer goods at each date without
any cost. Thus the total supply of consumer goods is c ≡ ya+ z at each date. I assume
that c is suﬃciently larger than ya such that
(1 − β)c>βya. (3)
At each date t, the government provides Ms
t+1 units of cash to this economy. The
diﬀerence Xt ≡ Ms
t+1 −Ms
t is a lump-sum transfer to (from) the consumer from (to) the
5government at date t. (The initial amount Ms
0 is given to the consumers at, say, date
−1 as a lump-sum subsidy.)
At each date t, the consumer chooses the amount of consumption ct, cash holdings
Mt+1, and land holdings at+1, given that he owns Mt units of cash and at units of land
at the beginning of date t. Denoting the nominal price of consumer goods by Pt and the
land price by Qt, the budget constraint for the consumer at date t is written as
Ptct + Mt+1 + Qtat+1 ≤ Pt(yat + z)+Qtat + Mt + Xt. (4)
I assume as an ordinary cash-in-advance model that a consumer cannot consume his own
endowment yat + z and needs to buy ct in the goods market from other consumers.
Consumers can buy the goods using cash and bank borrowing Bt. Thus, the con-
sumers must choose ct under the following liquidity constraint:
Ptct ≤ Mt + Bt.
Banks lend Bt to consumers competitively at the beginning of date t, and consumers
repay RtBt to the banks at the end of date t. As a result of the competition among
banks, the rate of return on bank borrowing within one date must be one: Rt =1 . I
assume that Bt works as a medium of exchange exactly like cash. In other words, I
assume that Bt is given in the form of a bank deposit and banks can create and provide
transaction services to depositors without cost.
I assume, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, 2001), that consumers can freely abscond,
leaving their land, and that there is no way for banks to penalize such borrowers. There-
fore, the consumers cannot precommit to repay Bt to banks, and only thing that banks
can do when the borrowers abscond is to seize the land. Following the arguments by
Kiyotaki and Moore, this assumption implies that a consumer is subject to the borrowing
constraint:
Bt ≤ Qtθtat,
where at is the land held by the consumer and θt (0 ≤ θt < 1) is the collateral ratio.
In this section, I simply assume that θt is an exogenously given parameter, while in
6the next section I argue an example of economic structure that determines θt as an
equilibrium outcome. Under this borrowing constraint, a consumer who borrows Bt will
never abscond and will repay Bt at the end of date t, since otherwise the bank will seize
his land, the value of which is Qtat (>B t).
The above arguments imply that the reduced form of the liquidity constraint for the
consumer is
Ptct ≤ Mt + Qtθtat. (5)
Therefore, the representative consumer’s problem is to maximize (2) subject to (4)
and (5). It is useful to clarify the timing of events. The representative consumer enters
date t with cash holdings Mt and land holdings at. At the beginning of date t,h ei sg i v e n
endowment (z) and yields on the land (yat), and he borrows Bt(= Qtθtat) from a bank.
The goods market opens ﬁrst, and the consumer sells goods yat + z and buys ct under
the constraint (5). After consumption takes place, the consumer repays Bt to the bank.
After repayment, the asset market then opens, and the consumer buys Mt+1 and at+1 by
selling the remaining assets, the nominal value of which is Pt(yat+z)+Mt+Qtat−Ptct.
The equilibrium conditions for cash, land, and consumer goods are
Mt = Ms
t , (6)
at = a, (7)
ct = c (≡ ya+ z). (8)
The monetary competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 The monetary competitive equilibrium is a set of prices {Pt,Q t}∞
t=0 and
allocations {ct,a t,M t}∞
t=0 that satisﬁes the following conditions: (a) The prices are pos-
itive and ﬁnite for all t: 0 <P t,Q t < ∞; (b) given the prices, the allocations solve the
consumer’s problem (i.e., maximization of [2] subject to [4] and [5]); (c) the allocations
satisfy the equilibrium conditions (6)—(8); and (d) the transversality conditions are sat-
isﬁed: limt→∞ λt =0and limt→∞ ηt =0 ,w h e r eλt and ηt are the Lagrange multiplier
for (4) and (5), respectively.
7Note that, as in the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (2001), there always exists a
nonmonetary equilibrium where cash has no value and only land provides transaction
services.2 In the nonmonetary equilibrium, Pt and Qt are inﬁnite, and qt =
Qt
Pt is ﬁnite.
In what follows in this section, I assume the liquidity parameter θt is constant over
time, i.e.,
θt = θ,
and analyze whether there exists a steady state equilibrium where prices are constant
over time. Denoting the Lagrange multipliers for (4) and (5) by λt and ηt, respectively,
the ﬁrst order conditions (FOCs) for the consumer’s problem are








λt = λt+1 + ηt+1. (11)
Note that since the fundamental price of the asset (QF
t )i sd e ﬁned as the asset price












λt from (11), it can be interpreted that
λt+1
λt is the present value
at t of one unit of cash at t + 1 as a store of value, and
ηt+1
λt is the present value at t
of transaction services that one unit of cash can provide at t + 1. The second term of
the right-hand side of (10) is the nominal present value at t of the transaction services
that one unit of land can provide at date t+ 1. In this paper I mainly focus on the case
where the supply of base money is constant: Ms
t = M for all t.O n e j u s t i ﬁcation for
this is that since the monetary authorities in reality do not seem to target asset prices,
it may be reasonable to assume that Ms
t is determined independently from changes in
asset prices. When Ms
t = M for all t, the steady state equilibrium exists, and the prices
can be easily derived from the FOCs, the liquidity constraint (5), and the equilibrium












Note that the fundamental price of the asset in the steady state is QF =
βPy
1−β.T h e r e f o r e ,
the “bubble” component of Q is Q − QF = θ
1−θQF (> 0), which reﬂects the function of
providing transaction services. That the price P in (14) must be positive and ﬁnite gives
the following condition for the existence of the steady state:
0 ≤ θ < θ ≡
(1 − β)c
(1 − β)c + βya
. (15)
If θ ≥ θ, there is no steady state monetary equilibrium for this economy. In fact, the
following stronger results are obtained:
Lemma 1 If θ ≥ θ and Ms
t = M for all t, a monetary competitive equilibrium does not
exist.
See Appendix A for the proof. In the case where the government can appropriately
control money supply Ms
t , it seems likely that there exists a competitive equilibrium
with a constant inﬂation rate. But this is not the case when θ is an exogenous constant.
Lemma 2 Assume that θt = θ (> 0) and the government can freely control Ms
t .D e ﬁne
a steady inﬂation equilibrium as a monetary competitive equilibrium in which πt =
Pt+1
Pt =
π(6=1 )and constraint (5) is always binding. There is then no monetary policy {Ms
t }∞
t=0
that can realize a steady inﬂation equilibrium.
See Appendix B for the proof. These lemmas imply that there is no stable equilibrium
path for the economy if θ > θ.3 Although I cannot specify further the behavior of the
model in the case where the government can freely control Ms
t , I conjecture that there
is no monetary competitive equilibrium if θ > θ e v e ni nt h ec a s ew h e r et h eg o v e r n m e n t
can freely control money supply Ms
t .
3Note that there exists a nonmonetary equilibrium even if θ > θ, which is not in our interest.
9One way to understand why the economy becomes unstable when θ exceeds θ is the
following: If θ ≥ θ, it is shown from (13) that
Qθa
Pc ≥ 1, which implies that constraint
(5) does not bind for any positive value of M. Therefore, it can be said that if θ ≥ θ,
the asset provides more liquidity than needed. Since θ can be interpreted as the ease of
borrowing from banks by putting up the asset as collateral, Qtθa in (5) can be interpreted
as the amount of bank lending collateralized by land. As the left-hand side of (5) can
be interpreted as the nominal output, the equivalent of
Qθa
Pc in reality may be the ratio
of bank lending collateralized by land to nominal GDP. Figure 3 shows this ratio during
and after the bubble period in Japan.
Figure 3. Ratio of loans covered by collateral to nominal GDP
The ratio increased markedly just before the bubble burst.
3 The model of endogenous liquidity
In the previous section I assumed that the collateral parameter θ is exogenously given.
In this section, I explicitly posit a formal mechanism that determines θt and argue how
the asset price behaves under changing θt.
I assume the following ineﬃciency in asset-seizure by banks. Suppose that a consumer
borrows Bt from a bank at the beginning of date t. If the borrower absconds during date
t, the bank seizes the borrower’s land, at, and sells it at a price of Qt at the end of
date t. I assume that the bank needs to pay for maintenance of the seized land until it
sells the land in the asset market, and the bank incurs the cost of maintenance, which is
xat in terms of the consumer goods. Under these conditions, competition among proﬁt-
maximizing banks implies that in the equilibrium, Bt =m a x {Qtat − Ptxat,0}.S i n c e
Bt = Qtθtat, the collateral ratio θt satisﬁes




Therefore, if banks have the above ineﬃcient technology for land maintenance, the collat-
eral ratio θt evolves by (16), given Qt and Pt. The deﬁnition of the monetary competitive
equilibrium thus needs to be modiﬁed:
10Deﬁnition 2 The monetary competitive equilibriumi sas e to fp r i c e sa n da l l o c a t i o n s
{Pt,Q t,c t,a t,M t,θt}∞
t=0 that satisﬁes all conditions in Deﬁnition 1 and (16).
The representative consumer’s problem is the same as the previous section, i.e., max-














As shown below, there are inﬁnitely many equilibria, even if the government ﬁxes the
money supply at a constant (Ms
t = M for all t). But all equilibrium paths eventually
jump to either of the following two equilibria:
Lemma 3 If Ms
t = M for all t, there exist two equilibria: the fundamental equilibrium







.I nt h es t e a d yi n ﬂation equilibrium, the inﬂation rate is constant
(
Pt+1
Pt = π∗ (> 1) for all t)a n dθt is always positive.
(Proof) Given that parameters satisfy (18), it is obvious that the prices and allocations







satisﬁes all conditions for a competitive
equilibrium.
Next I show that the equilibrium in which θt > 0 for all t uniquely exists. Suppose
θt > 0 for all t. The equations (16) and (5) imply that in the equilibrium,
θt =
c − mt
c + ax − mt
, (19)
where mt = M
Pt.S i n c eQt = Ptc−M





Equation (17) implies that in the equilibrium, the asset price follows Qt = Qt+1θt+1 +
β
Pt+1
Pt+2{Pt+1y +( 1− θt+1)Qt+1}. These conditions, taken together, give the diﬀerence






πt and G(π) ≡ β
y+x
π + c
a. It is shown as follows that the inﬂation rate
in the equilibrium must be π∗, which is the solution to F(π)=G(π). Since F(π) <G (π)
as π →∞and (18) implies that F(1) >G (1), the equilibrium inﬂation rate π∗ must be
larger than one. Suppose that ∃τ such that πτ < π∗. In this case, it is obvious from the
functional forms of F(π)a n dG(π)t h a tπt (t ≥ τ) monotonically decreases and becomes
less than one in ﬁnite steps, implying that Ptc becomes smaller than M eventually. This
means that the ﬁnancial constraint (5) becomes nonbinding from some time t0 onward,




Pt0 u0(c) > 0f o r
all t>t 0, implying that the transversality condition (limt→∞ λt = 0) is violated. This
contradicts the assumption that Pt is in the equilibrium path. Thus πt can never be
less than π∗. Next suppose that ∃τ such that πτ > π∗.I n t h i s c a s e ,πt monotonically
increases. Since limπ→∞ F(π)=0a n dl i m π→∞ G(π)= c
a, the diﬀerence equation (21)
becomes impossible to solve at a ﬁnite t.T h u sπt can never exceed π∗ in the equilibrium.
Therefore, πt = π∗ in the equilibrium. Given that πt = π∗, the equilibrium values are
determined by Pt =( π∗)tP0, and (20). (End of Proof of Lemma 3)


























and it becomes larger as time passes and converges to c
a + x −
βy
1−β.
Next I will show that there are inﬁnitely many equilibria in which θt = 0 initially,
and at some time τ, θτ becomes a positive value and the prices follow the steady inﬂation
equilibrium path (πt = π∗) from date τ onward.
Lemma 4 Assume that Ms
t = M for all t. For any date τ (τ > 0), there exist (multiple)
equilibria in which θt =0for t<τ, θt > 0 for t ≥ τ, and the prices are determined by
Pt =( π∗)t−τPτ and (20) from date τ onward.
12The following claim is useful to prove the lemma:
Claim 1 In the case where Ms = M for all t, the liquidity constraint (5) is binding if
θt =0 .
See Appendix C for the proof of this claim.
(Proof of Lemma 4) Proof is by construction. Suppose such an equilibrium exists for a
given τ. The prices from τ onward are determined by Pt =( π∗)t−τPτ and (20). Since
θt =0f o rt<τ and (5) is binding from Claim 1, the price before τ satisﬁes Pt = M
c for
t<τ. Since the economy is in the steady inﬂation equilibrium from τ onward, the asset
price at τ − 1s a t i s ﬁes
Qτ−1 = Qτθτ +
β





























which holds if πτ−1 ≤ π∗,s i n c eπ∗ is the solution to F(π)=G(π). The second inequality
of (24) is equivalent to Pτ > M
c , which also holds if πτ−1 > 1, since Pτ−1 = M
c .T h e r e f o r e ,
there exists a continuum of Pτ (or πτ−1)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes (24): 1 < πτ−1 ≤ π∗.O n c ePτ is
given, Pt is given by Pt =( π∗)t−τPτ,a n dQt is determined by (20), for t ≥ τ. The asset




y + βQt, for t ≤ τ − 1. (26)
( E n do fP r o o fo fL e m m a4 )
The reverse of Lemma 4 does not hold:
Lemma 5 If Ms
t = M for all t, there exists no equilibrium in which ∃τ such that θt > 0
for t<τ and θt =0for all t ≥ τ.
13(Proof) Suppose such an equilibrium exists. Since Claim 1 holds and θt =0f o ra l l
t(≥ τ), Pt = M
c and Qt =
Mβy
(1−β)c for t ≥ τ.S i n c e Qτ−1 satisﬁes (20) and Qτ−1 =
β Pτ












(1−β)c. This condition is rewritten as x<
βy
1−β, which cannot hold, since (18)
is assumed. Therefore, there is no Pτ−1 that realizes the equilibrium in which θt > 0f o r
t<τ and θt =0f o ra l lt ≥ τ. (End of Proof)
The above Lemmas 3, 4, and 5 imply there are at most four types of competitive
equilibria in this economy if Ms
t = M for all t: (a) The fundamental equilibrium; (b)
the steady inﬂation equilibrium in which πt = π∗; (c) the equilibrium where θt =0
initially and the economy jumps to the steady inﬂation equilibrium at some date τ;a n d
(d) the equilibrium where ∃τ (≥ 1) and ∃s (≥ 1) such that θ > 0f o rt<τ, θt =0f o r
t = τ,τ +1,···,τ +s−1, and the economy jumps to the steady inﬂation equilibrium at
date τ +s. The fourth type may or may not exist depending on the parameter values. If
it exists, πt (t<τ) decreases following F(πt)=G(πt+1)a n dQt is determined by (20).
The welfare implication is trivial. In this endowment economy, the consumption
is the same constant c in any equilibrium. Therefore, the utility of the representative
consumer is the same for all equilibria.
In the case where the government can control Ms
t freely, there may be a more com-
plicated equilibrium path for the asset price, but I will not fully specify the equilibrium
behavior of the model under ﬂexible Ms
t . I assumed the constant M, since decision-
making by the monetary authorities in reality seems independent from asset prices.
4 Equilibrium with sticky prices and bursting bubbles
The arguments in the previous section imply that there is no equilibrium path in which
the asset-price bubble bursts. The reason why the asset-price bubble never bursts in
the previous model can be explained intuitively as follows. In the previous model, the
14consumption ct is constant in any equilibrium, implying that the real interest rate is
always β−1−1. If the bubble bursts, the liquidity constraint (5) implies that the general
price level Pt must plummet, leading to a spike in the real interest rate. Since the real
interest rate cannot rise in the equilibrium, there is no equilibrium in which the bubble
bursts.
In this section it is shown that if the equilibrium condition ct = c is relaxed to ct ≤ c
and prices are sticky in the sense that Pt is predetermined at date t − 2a n dP0 and P1
are exogenously given, then there exist equilibria in which the bubble bursts at some
date. In what follows I assume u(ct)=
c1−σ
t
1−σ , where 0 < σ < 1.
In order to characterize such an equilibrium, it is necessary to relax the deﬁnition of
competitive equilibrium to allow for a temporary supply-demand gap:
Deﬁnition 3 A sticky price equilibrium is same as a monetary competitive equilibrium
deﬁned by Deﬁnition 2, except for that (a) the price level at date t is predetermined at
date t−2; (b) instead of (8), ct ≤ c is satisﬁed; and (c) if ct <c , the supply-demand gap
(c−ct) perishes without being consumed by anyone at date t and is borne as a lump-sum
cost by the consumer (= seller), and the budget constraint for the consumer at date t
becomes
Ptct + Mt+1 + Qtat+1 ≤ Pt(yat + z)+Qtat + Mt + Xt − ∆t, (28)
where ∆t is a lump-sum cost, which is exogenous for the consumer, and ∆t = Pt·(c−ct)
holds in the equilibrium.
The price at date t is predetermined at t−2, and the consumer (=seller) cannot reduce the
price Pt at date t even though he cannot sell all of his goods at Pt. Note that even under
sticky prices, the FOCs: (9), (11), and (17) must be satisﬁed, since the consumers solve
their optimization problem, taking the entire price path as given. Therefore, the FOCs
are always satisﬁed in a sticky price equilibrium, while the market clearing conditions
may not. This implies that if θt > 0 and the market clearing conditions are satisﬁed for
some t in the sticky price equilibrium, the equation (21) must be satisﬁed for t.
The concept of sticky price equilibrium is useful to analyze the situation where the
initial value of inﬂation rate π0(= P1
P0) exceeds π∗. (If prices are not sticky, the (expected)
15price P1 adjusts instantaneously at date 0 so that π0 never exceeds π∗.4)I fπ0 > π∗ and
prices are sticky, the price path, or πt, is determined by the diﬀerence equation (21) for
the time being, but the equation becomes impossible to solve eventually. In this case,
there exists a sticky price equilibrium where the bubble bursts at some date τ and cτ <c .
Lemma 6 Assume that Ms
t = M for all t, π0 exceeds π∗,a n dP0c>M.T h e r ee x i s t sa
sticky price equilibrium where at = a for all t,a n d∃τ such that θt > 0 for t<τ, θt =0
for t ≥ τ, cτ <c ,a n dct = c for t 6= τ.
(Proof) Proof is by construction. I construct an equilibrium where the economy jumps
to the fundamental equilibrium at date τ. Thus I assume that Pt = M
c for t ≥ τ +1 and
Qt =
Mβy
(1−β)c for t ≥ τ.S i n c ecτ <cin this equilibrium, Pτ = M
cτ .G i v e nπ0,g e n e r a t ea
(ﬁnite) sequence of πt by F(πt)=G(πt+1). Deﬁne τ by F(πτ−4) > c
a >F(πτ−3). Note
that πτ−3 is the last element of the above sequence. In this equilibrium, Pt (t ≤ τ − 2)
is determined by Pt = πt−1Pt−1,a n dQt (t ≤ τ − 2) is determined by (20).






















Pτ {Pτ−1y+(1−θτ−1)Qτ−1}+Qτ−1θτ−1.T h i s
4The initial condition is determined by exogenous or historical factors that are not speciﬁed in this
paper. As for Japan’s real estate bubble of the late 1980s, the most commonly accepted view is that
it developed through a combination of: (1) the expansion of the business cycle in the 1980s, which
tightened the real estate market and caused banks to rationally begin providing loans to real estate
development projects; (2) deregulation of the ﬁnancal industry, which made the banking industry more
competitive and banks inclined to take greater risk; and (3) economic growth and appreciation of the
yen, which allowed large ﬁrms to accumulate huge retained earnings and reduced the need for bank loans
in traditional industries. This historical coincidence encouraged Japanese banks to pour money in real
estate backed loans recklessly. I thank Masaru Yoshitomi for reminding about this history. Hoshi and
Kashyap (1999) empirically support this interpretation.
















It is easily shown that the system of three equations (29), (30), and (31) for three un-
knowns Qτ−1, Pτ−1,a n dcτ always has a unique solution that satisﬁes cτ <c .T h e r e f o r e ,
prices and allocations of a sticky price equilibrium are fully speciﬁed. (End of Proof)
Figure 4 shows the above sticky price equilibrium for speciﬁc parameter values.
Figure 4. Sticky price equilibrium with a bursting bubble
Note that this is not the unique sticky price equilibrium for given initial conditions (P0,
M, π0). The bubble can burst at any time that is less than or equal to τ deﬁned above.
There may be a sticky price equilibrium that corresponds to each timing of the bubble’s
puncturing. The timing τ in the above lemma is the upper limit for continuation of the
bubble when the initial inﬂation rate is given as π0 > π∗.
The welfare implications are straightforward. Welfare in a sticky price equilibrium
with a bursting bubble is lower than in the fundamental equilibrium, since cτ <c .
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has examined the emergence of asset-price bubbles in the case where the
asset can provide transaction services, using a variant of the cash-in-advance model.
The transaction services the asset can provide increase as its (real) price becomes higher,
since the owner of the asset can borrow more money by putting it up as collateral. Thus
the asset price may exceed its fundamental price, since the transaction services that it
can provide are an increasing function of the asset price, which reﬂects the value of the
transaction services that it can provide.
Introducing a parameter that represents the collateral ratio of the asset (θ), I showed
that the asset price can exceed the fundamental price in the steady state equilibrium,
that it is increasing in θ,a n dt h a ti fθ exceeds a threshold value, no stable equilibrium
c a ne x i s t .I nt h ec a s ew h e r eθ is endogenously determined, there exist multiple equilibria,
17where, in one equilibrium, the asset price equals its fundamental price, and it has a bubble
component in another. It was also shown that if the equilibrium concept is relaxed to
allow for sticky prices and a temporary supply-demand gap, there exists an equilibrium
in which a bubble develops temporarily and eventually bursts.
These theoretical results of this simpliﬁed model imply that if a bubble is generated
by the mechanism examined in this paper, an economy may become unstable or the
bubble may burst when θ becomes too large. If θ is measured by the collateral ratio in
bank lending, we may say that an asset-price bubble may emerge when the collateral
ratio of the asset exceeds its historical average.
Further research to measure the real equivalent of θ for land, stocks, and other assets
may be useful to measure asset-price bubbles and to predict their collapse.
6A p p e n d i x A
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
First I show that there is no equilibrium where liqiudity constraint (5) is always binding.
Proof is by contradiction. Suppose that such an equilibrium exists. The FOCs and the








Qt+1, for all t,a n d
Qt = Ptc−M
θa , for all t, where πt =
Pt+1





cπt+1 − (1 − θ)(πt+1 − β)M
Pt
θcπt+1 + θβya+( 1− θ)βc
. (32)
Note that f(β, M
P )= c
c+θya > β. The last inequality is from (3). This inequality
implies that there is a solution to π = f(π, M
P )t h a ti sl a r g e rt h a nβ,s i n c ef(π, M
P )i s
increasing in π and bounded from above. Deﬁne π as the (unique) solution to π = f(π,0).
π =
c−(1−θ)βc−βθya
θc . Note that π ≤ 1b e c a u s eθ ≥ θ by the assumption of this lemma.
Any path of {πt}∞
t=0 that is determined by (32) satisﬁes either that πt ≤ π for all t or
that ∃t such that πt > π. I will show the nonexistence of {πt}∞
t=0 by showing {πt}∞
t=0
cannot satisfy either condition.
Suppose that πt ≤ π for ∀t.T h e nM
Pt ≥ M
P0.S i n c e f(π, M
P ) is decreasing in M
P for
18π > β, f(π, M
Pt) <f(π, M
P0) <f(π,0) for all π (> β)a n dt. See Figure 5.
Figure 5
Deﬁne ˆ π as the solution to π = f(π, M
P0). Obviously β < ˆ π < π ≤ 1. Since f(π, M
Pt) <
f(π, M
P0), it is easily shown from Figure 5 that if ∃τ such that πτ > ˆ π,t h e nπt (t>τ)
monotonically increases and becomes +∞ in ﬁnite steps. Therefore, if the equilibrium
in which πt ≤ π for all t e x i s t s ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tπt ≤ ˆ π < π for all t.B u t i n
this case, since Ptc ≤ (ˆ π)tP0c and ˆ π < 1, limt→∞ Ptc =0<M. Therefore constraint (5)
becomes nonbinding eventually. This fact contradicts the assumption that (5) is always
binding in the equilibrium. Therefore {πt} cannot satisfy πt ≤ π for all t. Suppose that
∃τ such that πτ > π. In this case, it is also easily shown from Figure 5 that πt (t>τ)i s
monotonically increasing and becomes +∞ in ﬁnite steps. Thus πt cannot exceed π in
the equilibrium. The above arguments imply that there exists no equilibrium in which
constraint (5) is binding for all t.
Next, suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which ∃τ such that ητ = 0, i.e.,
constraint (5) becomes nonbinding for some date τ.I w i l l s h o w t h a t i f ητ =0 ,t h e n
ητ+1 =0 .S i n c eητ =0 ,λτ−1 = λτ, which implies Pτ+1 = βPτ. Since λτ = λτ+1+ητ+1 ≥
λτ+1, the asset price satisﬁes Qτ =
λτ+1
λτ (Pτ+1y + Qτ+1)+
ητ+1
λτ Qτ+1θ ≤ Pτ+1y +( 1−
θ)Qτ+1 + θ
λτ+1+ητ+1
λτ Qτ+1 = Pτ+1y + Qτ+1. Suppose that ητ+1 > 0. In this case (5) is
binding, and Pτ+1c = M + Qτ+1θa.T h e nM + Qτ+1θa − β(M + Qτθa) ≥ (1 − β)(M +
Qτ+1θa)−βPτ+1yθa = Pτ+1{(1−β)c−βyθa} > 0. The last inequality is from (3). This
inequality implies that Pτ+1c = βPτc ≤ βM +βQτθa<M+Qτ+1θa, which contradicts
the assumption that (5) is binding at date τ + 1. Therefore, it has been shown that
ητ+1 =0i fητ =0 .
By induction, if ητ =0 ,t h e nηt =0f o ra l lt (≥ τ). In this case, Pt+1 = βPt for all
t (≥ τ), which implies that limt→∞ λt =
βτ
Pτ u0(c) > 0. This violates the transversality
condition. It thus has been shown that there is no competitive equilibrium in which ∃τ
such that (5) is nonbinding at date τ.
The above arguments imply that there is no competitive equilibrium if θ ≥ θ and Ms
t
is constant over time.
197A p p e n d i x B
P r o o fo fL e m m a2








Qt+1, and liquidity con-
straint (5) implies Qt = Ptc−Mt
θa . Therefore, in the equilibrium where πt = π(6=1 ) ,t h e
following equation must be satisﬁed:
c = βyaθ + ωπc +
1
πtP0
{Mt − ωMt+1}, (33)
where ω = θ +( 1− θ)
β
π. This equation must hold for all t given that π 6=1 .T h e r e f o r e ,
the monetary policy must satisfy the constraint that Ms
t − ωMs
t+1 = πtP0x,w h e r ex is










In this case, (33) implies that π =
1−β
θ + β + 1









must be positive and ﬁnite. If ωπ < 1, then
limt→∞
Mt
Pt = ∞;i fωπ =1 ,t h e nMt
Pt = M0
P0 + tx,w h i c hg o e st oi n ﬁnity as time passes;
if ωπ > 1, then limt→∞
Mt
Pt = x
ωπ−1,w h i c hi sﬁnite and positive. Therefore, in a steady
inﬂation equilibrium, the government must set x such that ωπ > 1, i.e., x>βθya.B u t
in this equilibrium, constraint (5) must be binding. Therefore, c ≥ Mt
Pt for all t, implying
that c ≥ x
ωπ−1 = x
x−βθyac>c , which is a contradiction. Therefore, there is no steady
inﬂation equilibrium in this economy.
8A p p e n d i x C
P r o o fo fC l a i m1
Suppose that θτ = 0 and (5) becomes nonbinding at date τ in the equilibrium. In this
case, the Lagrange multiplier for (5) becomes zero at τ: ητ = 0. The FOCs and (5) imply
that Pτ+1 = βPτ,a n dPτc ≤ M. Therefore, Pτ+1c = βPτc<P τc ≤ M, which implies
that (5) is nonbinding at date τ+1. Thus, by induction, it is shown that ηt =0f o r∀t(≥ τ)




Pτ u0(c) > 0f o r
20t>τ, implying that the transversality condition (limt→∞ λt = 0) is violated. Therefore,
ηt 6=0i fθt = 0 in the equilibrium.
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Traded volume of land
Urban land prices (All urban land,
commercial)
Sources: White paper on land, infrastructure, and transport in Japan, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport.
Urban price index, Japan Real Estate Institute.
Note: Data for the index of urban land prices are as of the end of the fiscal year. End of FY1999 = 100.
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Sources: Bank of Japan; Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan.
Note: Data for loans covered by collateral are as of January of each fiscal year.Figure 4. Sticky price equilibrium with a bursting bubble 
 
 
Time P  π   Q  θ   c 
0 5.00  1.02 225.00  0  30.00 
1 5.10  1.03 230.50 0.45  30.00 
2 5.27  1.06 239.63 0.45  30.00 
3 5.59  1.13 257.47 0.46  30.00 
4 6.33  1.33 298.24 0.47  30.00 
5 8.43  2.18 413.42 0.49  30.00 
6 18.37  1.13 960.25 0.52  30.00 
7  20.80 1.82  1093.70  0.52 30.00 
8  37.76 0.04 31.67  0  1.32 
9  1.67  1.00  31.67 0 30.00 
10  1.67  1.00  31.67 0 30.00 
≈
∗ π 1.01 
Parameters: c=30, x=25, a=1, y=1, M=50, P0=5,β =0.95,σ =0.1,  0 π =
∗ π +0.01 
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Figure 5. 